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Abstract 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a significantly impairing anxiety disorder for 
which the most successful treatment, cognitive behaviour therapy, has 50-60% success rates, 
taking into account treatment refusals and dropout rates (Fisher & Wells, 2005).  Thus, factors 
that contribute to the persistence of OCD and interfere with treatment are likely being 
overlooked.  Indeed, Mancini and Gangemi (2004) have proposed that individuals with OCD 
have greater fear of guilt than others; that is, they dread being judged as guilty for not having 
done everything in their power to prevent some negative outcome.  This fear of guilt fuels 
obsessions and compulsions as individuals attempt to prevent, avoid, or neutralise the feared 
guilt.  However, few studies have explored fear of guilt in OCD, and no scales exist to measure 
this construct.  The role of fear of guilt in OCD was therefore examined across two studies.   
Study 1 explored the core features of fear of guilt in OCD, as well as the validity and 
reliability of the Fear of Guilt Scale (FOGS), a measure developed specifically to assess levels of 
trait fear of guilt in OCD.  Results indicate that the FOGS is a valid and reliable, two-factor 
measure, and greater FOGS scores significantly predict more severe OCD symptoms among 
nonclinical participants.  Study 2 aimed to determine whether fear of guilt evokes caution and 
feelings of doubt during the decision-making process, thereby making it more difficult to know 
when to stop and explaining perseveratory behaviour, such as compulsions in OCD.  Findings 
suggest that greater fear of guilt does not predict more time taken or information needed to make 
decisions, but higher fear of guilt predicts feelings of uncertainty when deliberating, as indicated 
by ratings of greater difficulty making decisions, lower confidence in having made the right 
decisions, and less satisfaction with decisions made.  Implications of these findings and the role 
that fear of guilt may play in the development and persistence of OCD are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a debilitating anxiety disorder that afflicts 1.6% 
of the population at some point in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005) and significantly impairs 
quality of life across several domains, including social life, self-worth, and community (Norberg, 
Calamari, Cohen, & Riemann, 2008).  OCD is characterised by recurrent, intrusive, and 
distressing thoughts, impulses, or images (obsessions) and repetitive behaviours or mental acts 
that the individual feels compelled to perform in order to relieve anxiety (compulsions).  
Common obsessions include fears about germs or contamination, doubting thoughts, and 
aggressive impulses (Purdon & Clark, 1993) and typical compulsions include excessive washing 
and cleaning, ordering and arranging, and repeated checking (Muris, Merckelbach, & Clavan, 
1997). 
 Cognitive-behavioural models of the development and persistence of OCD highlight the 
fact that obsessions are universal experiences, with 99% of the population reporting having 
experienced at least one intrusive image, impulse, or thought at some point (Purdon & Clark, 
1993; Rachman & de Silva, 1978).  According to leading models of OCD, individuals with OCD 
differ from nonclinical individuals in their negative appraisals, or interpretations, of the 
probability and severity of harm and of the significance and meaning of their obsessions.  People 
with OCD tend to overestimate the severity and chance that harm will occur and also tend to 
believe that harm is more likely if they are, rather than someone else is, in charge. At the same 
time, people with OCD tend to have an overvalued sense of responsibility for harm, such that 
any responsibility for a negative outcome is understood to equal full responsibility for the 
outcome and that failing to prevent harm is akin to actually causing harm (e.g., “Now that I know 
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this [content of the obsession] could happen, I have to prevent it; else, I might as well have done 
it myself”). The assumption of responsibility for negative outcomes evokes the compulsion, 
which is enacted to try to prevent the feared negative outcome, even if it is not logically 
connected with the outcome (Rachman, 1995; Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999).  
  In addition to appraisals of harm and responsibility, individuals with OCD often report 
that the intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses reveal their true personality and are evidence that 
they are (or at least may be) immoral, careless, or otherwise terrible (Rachman, 1995; Salkovskis 
et al., 1999).  Additionally, for the person vulnerable to OCD, the intrusive thought is often 
perceived as being the moral equivalent of having performed the action itself (moral thought-
action fusion) and is viewed as being a precursor to action, its very recurrence thus increasing the 
probability that the feared harm will take place; both types of thought-action fusion are likely to 
lead to feelings of guilt (Rachman, 1995).  Purdon and Clark (1999) propose that whereas people 
not prone to developing OCD tend to assimilate aberrant thoughts into the self-view (i.e., “Gee, 
even a person like me can have a thought like this”), individuals prone to developing OCD may 
be more likely to accommodate the self-view to be consistent with the thought (i.e., “Oh my 
goodness, perhaps I am a homicidal maniac at heart!”).  
Individuals with OCD also report greater uncertainty and dichotomy in their self-concept 
(i.e., self-ambivalence); that is, they report conflicting beliefs about their self-construct, have 
mixed feelings about their self-worth, and view themselves in dichotomous ways (e.g., “Either I 
am a good or a bad person”; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007).  Given that individuals with OCD are high in 
self-ambivalence and the content of the obsessions often contradicts valued aspects of the self or 
violates valued perceptions of the self (Purdon & Clark, 1999; Rowa & Purdon, 2003), intrusions 
are especially distressing.   
3 
 
 In sum, cognitive-behavioural models assert that beliefs about harm, overvalued 
responsibility, thought-action fusion, and over-importance of the meaning of thoughts drive 
individuals to make attempts to neutralise the harm (e.g., wash and check repeatedly), 
compensate for the negative outcome (e.g., perform rituals, seek reassurance), avoid future 
intrusive thoughts (e.g., suppress thoughts or avoid thought triggers), and become more vigilant 
for signs of preventable harm.  These behaviours are negatively reinforced because they tend to 
briefly relieve the individual of anxiety.  Yet, ironically, this selective attention for obsessions 
triggers them, thus affirming beliefs that the thought is important and meaningful (why else 
would it recur even when you don’t want it to?) and evoking the compulsion. That harm does not 
occur is attributed to the performance of the compulsion rather than to the fact that the feared 
outcome was vague and uncertain in the first place. The insidious cycle thus persists (Rachman, 
1995; Salkovskis et al., 1999).   
 These models have received substantial empirical support and inform standard cognitive-
behaviour treatment protocols, which are the most successful, first-line psychological treatment 
for OCD, with success rates of 80-90%. However, when treatment refusal and dropout rates are 
taken into account, the success rate is much less impressive, dropping to 50-60% (Fisher & 
Wells, 2005).  After more than 20 years of research dedicated to identifying and developing 
means of modifying negative appraisals of obsessions we have been unable to improve this 
success rate.  Thus, psychological models may be overlooking factors that contribute to the 
persistence of OCD and interfere with treatment success.   
OCD, Morality and Guilt 
More recently, OCD research has begun to focus on understanding the persistence of 
compulsions and the motivating factors involved in compulsively performing perseverative 
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behaviours.  In particular, researchers are now exploring the role that heightened moral 
sensitivity and elevated concern about moral issues may play in perpetuating obsessive-
compulsive (OC) phenomena (e.g., Franklin, McNally, & Riemann, 2009; Doron, Sar-El, 
Mikulincer, & Kyrios, 2012). 
 Rachman (1980) first described individuals with OCD as being of tender conscience, 
fearing that they would be judged in a negative light or rejected by others if the presence and 
content of their obsessions were to be known.  Since then, other researchers have also noted that 
OCD symptoms appear to be intricately linked with moral aspects of the individual’s self-
concept.  Doron, Kyrios, and Moulding (2007) describe sensitive self-domains as domains of the 
self that individuals highly value but in which they feel incompetent.  Studies have found that 
sensitivity in the morality self-domain is associated with higher levels of OC-related beliefs 
(including an inflated sense of responsibility, perfectionism, and belief that one should be able to 
control one’s thoughts) and greater severity of OC symptoms, after controlling for self-worth, 
both in a nonclinical sample (Doron et al., 2007) and in a sample of participants with OCD.  
Furthermore, self-sensitivity in the morality domain appears to be specific to the experience of 
OCD: individuals with OCD showed significantly more sensitivity in the morality domain 
compared to community controls, whereas individuals with other anxiety disorders did not differ 
from the control sample in morality self-ratings (Doron, Moulding, Kyrios, & Nedeljkovic, 
2008).  Thus, moral concerns and moral emotions may strongly impact the experience and 
severity of OCD symptoms. 
 Certainly, clinical anecdotal evidence tells us that guilt is an important part of the 
phenomenology of OCD.  Guilt is a moral emotion involving feelings of regret or remorse over a 
perceived transgression and implies responsibility or culpability for that transgression.  Whereas 
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the self is often the focus of evaluation in shame, encouraging the individual to escape or 
withdraw, guilt involves an intense preoccupation with one’s behaviour and is associated with 
the drive to rectify, repair, or resolve the situation (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). 
For example, in OCD, guilt is a primary concern in moral, sexual, and religious 
obsessions.  Guilt may also be a factor in aggressive, contamination-related, and doubting 
compulsions (Rachman, 1993; Shafran, Watkins, & Charman, 1996; Shapiro & Stewart, 2011; 
Tallis, 1994).  Not-just-right-experiences (NJREs), in which the individual experiences 
uncomfortable sensations that things are not quite right, are frequently reported by individuals 
with OCD and have been linked to increased feelings of guilt (Mancini, Gangemi, Perdighe, & 
Marini, 2008).  Yet, despite anecdotal reports of the significance of guilt in OCD, study results 
tend to be mixed, and there is no consistent evidence suggesting that individuals with OCD differ 
from others in levels of trait or state guilt (Shafran et al., 1996; Steketee, Quay, & White, 1991). 
 Mancini and Gangemi (2004a) have instead posited that individuals with OCD are higher 
in fear of guilt rather than in trait or state guilt per se.  That is, individuals with OCD fear that 
they will be judged as guilty for not having done everything in their power to prevent the 
negative occurrence.  They may feel that they are being judged by or being held to high moral 
standards, whether the judgment is done by him/herself or by some real or imagined third party, 
with stringent criteria for satisfactory performance and successfully meeting such standards.  
Thus, individuals with OCD may not necessarily be behaving consistently with their own morals, 
of whose competence they may feel uncertain, but with the morals they feel expected to uphold.  
Indeed, Bhar and Kyrios (1999) noted that socially prescribed perfectionism – that is, the belief 
that others have perfectionistic standards for oneself – predicted a significant amount of variance 
in OCD symptoms, over and above depression, in a nonclinical sample.  
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Importantly, Mancini and Gangemi (2004a) noted that in OCD, the distress experienced 
as a result of feared guilt arises not from fear of the negative outcome itself, but from fear of 
being held as responsible for the negative outcome or resultant harm.  Thus, the focus is on one’s 
own performance, and whether one’s actions would meet the moral standards to which one is 
held, rather than on the negative outcome to be prevented.  This may explain why the focus in 
compulsions is often on completing the behaviours properly or repeating the behaviours until the 
individual is satisfied with his/her performance. 
High fear of guilt may drive obsessions and compulsions in individuals with OCD, as 
they aim to avoid, prevent, or neutralise the feared feeling of guilt and reduce feelings of moral 
violation.  Specifically, fear of guilt may cause individuals to be vigilant for and sensitive to 
ways in which actions or inactions could potentially cause harm.  In support of this, Gangemi, 
Mancini, and van den Hout (2007) found that individuals who are prone to feeling guilty tend to 
use state feelings of guilt as indicators of threat and risk in a situation more than those who are 
lower in trait guilt. 
The feared feeling of guilt would then also motivate individuals to ensure that harm has 
not, is not, and will not occur.  These pressures would lead individuals to perseverate until the 
possibility of being held responsible for that harm is perceived to have passed (i.e., they will 
continue until they no longer feel that there is any danger for which they could be held 
responsible).  Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to prove conclusively that danger has passed 
or that the possibility of harm no longer exists (i.e., the absence of something; Mancini & 
Gangemi, 2004a).  In this way, fear of guilt may create uncertainty, making it difficult to decide 
when to stop, and leading individuals to perseverate until they have achieved an internal sense of 
knowing and/or adopt arbitrary stop rules to help them decide how much is sufficient 
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(Szechtman & Woody, 2004; Wahl, Salkovskis, & Cotter, 2008).  We hypothesise that greater 
fear of guilt in individuals with OCD would manifest itself through two types of behaviours: 
reactive behaviours performed in response to the feeling of guilt and proactive behaviours 
performed to prevent or minimise guilty feelings.   
First, the experience of guilt and the elevated fear associated with feeling guilty drives 
the individual with OCD to immediately atone or compensate for the guilt.  These reactive 
behaviours may include reassurance seeking; repeated checking, washing, or other compensatory 
rituals; post-event processing to prepare for similar situations in the future; depriving oneself of 
enjoyable activities; and otherwise attempting to atone for one’s sins or to punish oneself.  It may 
be especially important for individuals with OCD to atone for wrongdoings as soon as possible, 
driving them to react immediately to obsessions and triggers, because a delay in atonement may 
be perceived as an attempt to evade responsibility or get away with immoral behaviours.   
Indeed, in a study by Mancini and Gangemi (2004), students who experienced moral 
emotions in response to a hypothetical situation, either as a victim of an injustice or the 
perpetrator guilty of the act, always chose to respond with an action that would re-establish 
justice.  Regardless of whether the options were framed as risky or riskless choice, victims would 
seek justice while guilty individuals chose to atone for their wrongdoings.  Thus, moral emotions 
direct the choices one makes.  More specifically, the experience of guilt drives individuals to 
seek atonement.  It is thus conceivable that high fear of guilt individuals would feel the need to 
atone or punish themselves, further exacerbating any compulsions that would also serve as 
reactive behaviours.  These individuals may then feel relief or a sense of justice after performing 
reactive behaviours, further reinforcing these responses and perpetuating the cycle of OCD. 
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Second, the experience of heightened fear of guilt may be so unpleasant that individuals 
with OCD are encouraged to avoid feeling guilty at all costs, consequently performing proactive 
behaviours to prevent feeling the feared guilt or to minimise the intensity of the guilty feeling.  
These proactive behaviours may include hypervigilance for possible guilty events (i.e., negative 
outcomes for which one would bear responsibility for that outcome); reassurance seeking to 
ensure no wrong has been done; preemptive, repeated checking and cleaning; and avoidance of 
triggers or additional responsibility.  Since it is almost impossible to ever completely atone for 
something, individuals with OCD may deem it safer to prevent ever being in that guilty position, 
increasing the frequency and intensity of proactive behaviours as their fear of guilt rises.   
In fact, Doron et al. (2008) noted that individuals with OCD show increased vigilance for 
intrusions that threaten their sense of morality, a sensitive self-domain.  Wroe, Salkovskis, and 
Richards (2000) found that individuals with OCD and without OCD alike are more likely to take 
action to prevent harm in obsession-relevant than obsession-irrelevant situations; however, 
because those with OCD experience more intrusions in obsession-relevant situations than 
individuals without OCD (Wroe et al., 2000), greater fear of guilt would mean stronger impetus 
to perform preventative acts to avoid guilt-evoking obsession-relevant situations.  Even in 
Rachman and Hodgson’s (1980) description those with OCD as individuals of ‘tender 
conscience’, they noted that such individuals would be likely to be especially vigilant for 
possible moral violations and ways to prevent being implicated.  Thus, individuals with OCD 
who demonstrate greater fear of guilt may exert greater effort in proactively avoiding or 
minimising the feeling of guilt. 
The fear of guilt construct fits well into existing models of the development and 
persistence of OCD.  In the cognitive-behavioural model outlined by Salkovskis, Rachman, and 
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colleagues, higher fear of guilt would mean greater concern about responsibility to prevent harm 
and, additionally, fear that they would be judged as responsible for that harm, should it occur.  
Similarly, as perceived responsibility for a negative outcome is increased, fear of being guilty for 
that harm is also heightened.  Misappraisals of obsessions would be further exacerbated by fear 
of guilt, making it more urgent for individuals to perform compulsions in an attempt to avoid, 
prevent, and/or atone for guilty feelings.  The reactive and proactive behaviours hypothesised to 
arise from heightened fear of guilt encapsulate well the range of OC neutralising, safety, 
reassurance-seeking, and vigilance behaviours described above in the model of OCD.  As these 
reactive and proactive behaviours are reinforced, by temporarily relieving anxiety-inducing 
feelings of guilt or by leading individuals to believe in the efficacy of guilt-preventative efforts, 
these individuals reaffirm their belief that culpability for a negative event is unbearable, 
perpetuating OCD symptoms. 
Fear of guilt is an emerging area of research in OCD literature, and few studies have 
specifically explored fear of guilt, let alone fear of guilt and OCD.  Mancini and Gangemi 
(2004b) described individuals who experience fear of guilt and heightened responsibility as 
engaging in a prudential mode of hypothesis testing.  In the prudential mode, individuals focus 
on the worst possible outcome, search for evidence that confirms the worst hypothesis (the 
“danger hypothesis”) – that is, they believe that there is threat and persist in checking if the threat 
is present rather than trying to prove that there is no threat – and devalue any evidence that 
disconfirms this negative hypothesis.  Individuals further seek to disconfirm any hypotheses 
involving more positive outcomes and maintain the worst-case hypotheses by continuing to test 
them in this prudential hypothesis-testing process (Mancini & Gangemi, 2004b).   
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Preliminary research involving nonclinical participants who completed a complicated 
deductive task suggests that perceived responsibility is important in driving hypothesis-testing 
for threat, and fear of guilt plays a significant role, above and beyond the contributions of 
perceived responsibility, in eliciting this focus on threat.  The authors suggest that this 
prudential-mode of hypothesis testing may explain why individuals with obsessive beliefs in 
OCD are resistant to change and why individuals perseverate in their attempts to neutralise the 
danger.  That is, much like seeds of doubt planted in their minds, individuals fear being guilty for 
a negative outcome, because they perceive high responsibility, and proactively check for danger 
using the prudential mode of hypothesis testing.  However, the authors stress the need to explore 
the presence of prudential-testing strategies among an OCD population in further studies 
(Mancini & Gangemi, 2006).   
Further research conducted on fear of guilt has demonstrated that both fear of guilt and 
perceived responsibility exacerbate OC tendencies in healthy participants.  In a study by 
Mancini, d’Olimpio, and Cieri (2004), participants were shown eight objects on a screen and 
asked to accurately recreate the location of all objects.  Participants who were informed that poor 
participant performance on the task would lead to a negative outcome (high responsibility 
condition) and that they had already performed poorly due to inattention (high fear of guilt 
group) showed more hesitation in the task, by moving objects more frequently when recreating 
the configurations, and performed more checks than individuals in the high responsibility 
condition alone.  These two groups also demonstrated more OC-like behaviours than the control 
group and took longer to complete the task, suggesting that perceived responsibility and fear of 
guilt are two independent factors that contribute to compulsions (Mancini et al., 2004). 
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Yet, overall, very little is actually known about fear of guilt in OCD.  Studies thus far 
have used experimental manipulation methods to induce fear of guilt, but they have not 
concomitantly used rating scales or other inventories to measure fear of guilt.  In fact, no 
empirical measure of fear of guilt exists in the OCD literature, and it is unknown what key 
factors comprise the construct.  Therefore, the aims of Study 1 were to determine the core 
features of fear of guilt and develop and validate a measure of fear of guilt for OCD research. 
In addition, no research has been conducted on possible mechanisms by which fear of 
guilt is linked to OCD or can explain the persistence of OCD symptoms.  While research 
suggests that fear of guilt induction elicits more compulsions, more hesitation, and a prudential 
mode of hypothesis testing (Mancini et al., 2004; Mancini & Gangemi, 2004b, 2006), it is 
unclear whether increases in hesitation and checking are attributable to a focus on danger alone, 
as proposed by Mancini and Gangemi (2006), or if they reflect broader difficulties with making 
decisions, lest they be held responsible for the outcome.   
Indeed, several researchers consider doubting and indecisiveness a basic characteristic of 
OCD (Summerfeldt et al., 1998), and research supports the notion that some compulsions arise 
from difficulty deciding when to terminate the behaviour, because the individuals rely on a 
subjective, internal sense that it is appropriate to stop (Cougle, Goetz, Hawkins, & Fitch, 2012; 
Lazarov, Dar, Oded, & Liberman, 2010; Szechtman & Woody, 2004; Wahl et al., 2008).   
Researchers have described NJREs as an uncomfortable feeling of incompleteness that 
motivates individuals to repeat behaviours until it feels ‘just right’ (Summerfeldt, 2004), and one 
study found that the number and intensity of NJREs, measured on a questionnaire and induced in 
vivo, predicted the duration of hand washing among nonclinical individuals (Cougle et al., 2011).  
Wahl and colleagues (2008) also found that individuals with OCD who wash compulsively use 
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subjective criteria more frequently and consider them more important for terminating washes 
than non-washing individuals with OCD and healthy controls.  Additionally, regardless of type 
of compulsion, individuals with OCD used more criteria than control participants before 
stopping, increasing the length of hand washing.  This suggests that elevated evidence 
requirements are a general strategy in OCD and that the use of subjective criteria impedes 
stopping ability,  
In fact, Szechtman and Woody (2004) have proposed that OCD is fundamentally a 
disorder of stopping, wherein individuals are unable to achieve a satisfying internal sense that 
they have completed a task (i.e., they are an unable to achieve a ‘yedasentience’ signal), although 
they are able to recognise rationally that the task appears complete, and therefore perseverate on 
tasks for abnormal lengths of time.  Interestingly, Lazarov and colleagues (2010) found that OC 
tendencies may lead individuals to rely more on objective, external cues to guide behaviour in 
order to compensate for their mistrust of subjective, internal cues.  Nonclinical individuals with 
more OC behaviours performed worse on a relaxation task, displaying greater fluctuations in 
stress and greater stress overall, than those with fewer OC tendencies.  However, when given 
biofeedback information –external indicators of internal relaxation states – while completing the 
relaxation task, higher OC individuals performed better than lower OC participants.  Thus, 
higher OC people perform poorly when required to rely on their own internal cues, but when 
given the opportunity, they are able to use external cues to better guide their behaviour (Lazarov, 
Dar, Oded, & Liberman, 2010). 
Additional research has found that individuals with OCD generally have difficulty 
making decisions in a more effortful, cognitive task.  In a decision-making study involving 
hypothetical scenarios with varying degrees of risk, individuals with OCD requested more 
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information about the scenarios than non-anxious controls and took a longer time to deliberate 
before making choices in low risk and OCD-relevant scenarios, but not in high risk scenarios.  
The authors attribute this indecisiveness to the possibility that low risk scenarios are considered 
to be far riskier by individuals with OCD than those without, whereas high risk scenarios were 
considered equally risky by all (Foa et al., 2003).  Although they do not suggest mechanisms that 
would explain these findings, fear of guilt could be one such factor that leads individuals with 
OCD to perceive that decisions are riskier than non-anxious individuals would deem them. 
We propose that perseveration and indecisiveness of individuals with OCD may perhaps 
be explained through a cautious decision-making style that is driven by heightened fear of guilt.  
That is, because they rely on subjective, internal criteria to know when to stop, but do not trust 
their internal sense of knowing and, furthermore, fear being guilty for harm resulting from a 
wrong decision, they will show more caution when making decisions and report greater 
uncertainty in having made the right decision.  Study 2 therefore seeks to explore whether high 
fear of guilt individuals require more time and more information before making decisions and 
whether they feel more doubt in their performance, leading them to perseverate with 
compulsions.  
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Study 1: Development and Initial Validation of a Measure of Fear of Guilt 
There is currently no instrument available to measure fear of guilt as it pertains to OCD.  
Thus, the aims of this study were to: a) operationalize the construct and determine the core 
features of fear of guilt, b) develop a valid and reliable measure of fear of guilt for empirical use 
in studies of OCD, and c) determine whether fear of guilt is related to OC symptomatology, such 
that greater fear of guilt predicts more severe OC symptoms. 
Methods 
Initial Development of the Fear of Guilt Scale 
Three key components of the fear of guilt construct were identified and defined by Drs. 
Christine Purdon and Adam Radomsky, two experts in OCD research.  These three factors were 
identified as: (1) belief in the overvalued importance and meaning of guilt; (2) reactive 
behaviours performed in response to the feeling of guilt; and (3) proactive behaviours performed 
in order to prevent or minimise potential guilty feelings.  Drs. Purdon and Radomsky generated a 
pool of 50 items designed to reflect each of these three factors thought to comprise fear of guilt.  
The items were presented on a 7-point Likert scale, and participants were asked to rate the extent 
to which they agreed with each of the statements.  See Appendix A for the original, 50-item Fear 
of Guilt Scale (FOGS), with each item categorised by the factor it was hypothesised to target. 
Participants 
This study was completed in two parts, wherein undergraduate students completed for 
course credit the FOGS and various self-report measures of anxiety, depression, guilt, and/or 
neuroticism.  These measures were specifically selected to explore the convergent, discriminant, 
and concurrent validity of the FOGS.  In Group 1, 366 participants completed the FOGS, Guilt 
Inventory, Depression Anxiety Stress Scale, Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, and Neuroticism 
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Scale of the International Personality Item Pool.  Participant ages ranged from 17- to 44-years-
old, with a mean age of 20 (standard deviation of 3.7 years).  Participants in Group 1 were 60% 
female.  In Group 2, 874 participants completed the FOGS and two measures of social anxiety – 
the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale and Social Phobia Inventory – included for discriminant 
validity analyses.  Group 2 participants were 66% female and ranged in age from 17- to 54-
years-old (mean of 20, SD of 3.7 years).   
Measures 
Fear of Guilt Scale (FOGS; Chiang, Purdon, & Radomsky, 2012) 
As described above, the preliminary version of the FOGS contained 50 items designed to 
determine the extent to which respondents fear the guilty feeling and behave in ways to 
minimise, prevent, or atone for guilt.  Items were presented on a 7-point Likert scale.   
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI; Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998) 
The 42-item OCI is a self-report questionnaire that asks participants to rate the frequency 
and distress with which they experience common obsessions and compulsions.  Items are rated 
on a 5-point Likert scale and summed to produce a total score of OCD symptom severity.  The 
OCI is recognised to have excellent psychometric properties (Foa et al., 1998). 
International Personality Item Pool, Neuroticism Scale (IPIP-N; Goldberg, 2001) 
 The IPIP-N is a brief, 10-item scale that assesses an individual’s tendency to respond to 
stress with negative affect.  Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale and summed for a total 
neuroticism score.  Preliminary research suggests that this scale has good internal consistency 
and relates strongly to the corresponding Neuroticism factor of the NEO Personality Inventory 
(Gow, Whiteman, Pattie, & Deary, 2005). 
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Guilt Inventory (GI; Kugler & Jones, 1992) 
 The GI is a 45-item self-report scale that measures an individual’s tendency to experience 
guilt using three different subscales: trait guilt (i.e., dispositional tendency), state guilt (i.e., 
current affect), and moral standards (i.e., rigidity of moral beliefs).  Studies in clinical and social 
psychology indicate that the GI has acceptable psychometric properties (Jones, Schratter, & 
Kugler, 2000). 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, 21-item version (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
 The 21-item DASS asks participants to rate their tendency to experience negative 
emotional states.  The DASS-21 is a short version of the parent, 42-item DASS and retains its 
factor structure.  Responses are therefore summed according to three different scales: stress or 
tension, anxiety, and depression.  The DASS-21 has also retained the full DASS’ strong 
psychometric properties (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 2001). 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987) 
 This 24-item scale measures an individual’s avoidance of various social situations and 
level of anxiety experienced during such situations, using a 4-point Likert scale.  Scored 
responses yield separate fear and avoidance scales for performance and social interaction 
situations, as well as a total social anxiety score.  The LSAS is recognised to have good internal 
consistency, convergent validity, and divergent validity (Heimberg et al., 1999). 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2001) 
The SPIN is a 17-item self-report scale that assesses an individual’s level of fear, 
avoidance, and physiological symptoms in social situations due to social anxiety.  The items are 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale and are summed to produce a total social anxiety severity score.  
The SPIN is also recognised to have excellent psychometric properties (Connor et al., 2001). 
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Data Analyses 
In order to determine the factor structure and the psychometric properties of the FOGS, 
exploratory factor, reliability, correlation, and hierarchical regression analyses were performed.  
Since different measures were completed by the two participants groups, some analyses are 
replicated across the two groups, and other analyses are conducted on one group alone. 
Results 
FOGS Factors 
To determine the factor structure of the FOGS, an Exploratory Factor Analysis using an 
oblimin rotation was conducted on data from both participant groups.  Use of the oblimin 
rotation allowed extracted factors to be correlated instead of orthogonal.  Analyses of the Scree 
plots and factor loadings of individual items yielded similar results across both data sets.  The 
most parsimonious and interpretable solution suggested a two-factor structure, and the two 
factors explained 43.0% of the total variance in the FOGS.  Two items (“If I feel guilty, it means 
I have done something bad” and “Anything I can do to avoid feeling guilty is worth doing”) were 
dropped from the FOGS, because they loaded equally poorly on the two extracted factors.  
Factor loadings of individual items are displayed in Table 1. 
The two extracted factors were labelled based on high-loading items comprising each 
factor.  The first factor consisted of 34 items, and it largely contained content describing an 
individual’s drive to atone for guilt and his/her beliefs about the meaning of guilt.  For example, 
items that loaded onto the first factor include “When I have done something for which I feel 
guilty, it is only right that I punish myself,” and “If I feel guilty, it means that I have failed as a 
person.”  Factor 1 was therefore labelled Reactive Response to the feared feeling of guilt.  On the 
other hand, the content of the 14 items comprising the second factor mostly described efforts to 
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prevent or minimise future feelings of guilt.  For instance, high-loading items from the second 
factor include “I do everything in my power to prevent harm or offence to any living creature,” 
and “When I feel guilty, I am even more careful not to cause harm or offence than I was before.”  
Factor 2 was labelled Proactive Response to guilt. 
Total Reactive Response and Proactive Response scores were calculated by summing 
ratings for items that loaded on each of the extracted factors.  All FOGS item ratings were also 
summed to produce a total FOGS score.  Pearson correlations were performed to determine 
relationships between the two extracted factors and total FOGS score.  The Reactive Response 
and Proactive Response factors were closely related, as expected due to the use of oblimin 
rotation, and correlations were highly similar across Groups 1 and 2 (respectively, r = .680 and 
.645, p < .01).  Each factor was also very strongly related to the total FOGS score, with nearly 
identical correlations in both groups.  The Reactive Response factor and total score were 
correlated at r = .981 and .975, p < .01, while the Proactive Response factor and total FOGS 
score were correlated at r = .811 and .798, p < .01. 
Internal Consistency 
The overall reliability of the scale was .96 in both groups, suggesting excellent reliability.  
Cronbach’s alpha was also calculated for each of the individual subscales, and results from both 
groups indicate that the two factors are similarly high in internal consistency.  The Reactive 
Response factor had alphas of .962 and .958 in Groups 1 and 2, respectively, whereas the 
Proactive Response factor yielded alphas of .854 and .877. 
Convergent Validity 
In order to determine the extent to which this measure of fear of guilt converged with 
questionnaires measuring related constructs, participant scores on the FOGS scales were 
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correlated with scores from guilt and anxiety inventories completed by Group 1.  More 
specifically, participant scores on the FOGS Reactive Response and Proactive Response scales 
were correlated with scores on the GI State Guilt, Trait Guilt, and Total Guilt scales, the DASS 
Stress and Anxiety scales, and the OCI Total score.  All correlations are displayed in Table 2.  
Results suggest that the Reactive Response factor is strongly correlated with ratings of state and 
trait guilt, stress and anxiety, and severity of OCD symptoms, with correlations ranging from .43 
to .57 (p < .01).  Proactive Response is less strongly related to the same constructs, with weak to 
moderate correlations of .20 to .38 (p < .01).   
Discriminant Validity 
 To assess the FOGS’ ability to successfully discriminate fear of guilt from more weakly 
related constructs, FOGS factor scores were correlated with Group 1 participant measures of 
depression, neuroticism, and moral standards, as well as Group 2 social anxiety scales.  FOGS 
Reactive Response and Proactive Response correlations with DASS Depression, IPIP 
Neuroticism, GI Moral Standards, SPIN Total, and LSAS Total are presented in Table 3.  
Findings indicate that Reactive Response is weakly related to the rigidity of one’s moral 
standards (r = .22, p < .01), but moderately correlated with scores on depression, neuroticism, 
and social anxiety measures (r = .32 to .43, p < .01).  The Proactive Response factor is weakly 
related to the same scales (r = .18 to .23, p < .01). 
Concurrent Validity 
 A hierarchical regression analysis was also conducted to determine whether fear of guilt, 
as measured by FOGS factors, could significantly predict severity of OCD symptoms after 
controlling for participant levels of anxiety, depression, neuroticism, and guilt.  Group 1 study 
variables were entered in three steps, with total OCI score as the dependent variable.  DASS 
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Anxiety, Stress, Depression, and IPIP Neuroticism scores were entered first (Step 1), followed 
by GI State Guilt, Trait Guilt, and Moral Standard scores (Step 2), and, lastly, FOGS Reactive 
Response and Proactive Response scales (Step 3). 
 Overall, the regression model was significant, R
2
 = .51, F (9,337) = 38.87, p < .001.  In 
Step 1, anxiety, stress, depression, and neuroticism accounted for 45% of the variance in OCI 
scores (p < .001).  Guilt variables in Step 2 only explained 1% additional variance in OCI scores, 
which was not significant at p = .14.  However, the addition of fear of guilt scales in Step 3 
significantly increased the variance explained by 5% (p < .001).   
 Notably, comparisons of zero-order and semi-partial correlation analyses of predictor 
variables with OCI score suggest that Proactive Response is being suppressed by Reactive 
Response.  While the relationship between Proactive Responses to feared guilt and OCD 
symptom severity appears to be positive (r = .21), the negative semi-partial correlation (r = -.12) 
indicates that there is a week negative relationship between the two variables when accounting 
for the Reactive Response variable.  This suppression is likely due to shared variance between 
Proactive Responses and Reactive Responses, a positive relationship, and another positive 
relationship between Reactive Responses and the DV.  Thus, typically, the greater one’s 
tendency to perform proactive behaviours to prevent or minimise guilt, the lower the severity of 
one’s OCD symptoms; however, the relationship between Reactive Response and OCI scores 
masks this relationship;  More detailed results are shown in Table 4.   
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Table 1.  Factor loadings of items from the Fear of Guilt Scale. 
Group 1 (N = 366) 
Item 
No. 
Factor 1 –  
Reactive 
Response 
Factor 2 – 
Proactive 
Response 
28 .852 -.077 
33 .844 -.133 
30 .802 .035 
35 .796 -.116 
29 .785 .021 
34 .784 .018 
39 .780 -.023 
40 .754 .012 
25 .753 .021 
32 .723 .158 
44 .712 .055 
24 .710 .013 
41 .687 .072 
2 .682 -.195 
37 .677 -.226 
47 .633 .161 
9 .616 .046 
36 .610 .118 
45 .586 .142 
31 .567 .154 
46 .564 .019 
20 .536 .146 
27 .527 .305 
43 .514 .279 
48 .508 .173 
 
Item 
No. 
Factor 1 –  
Reactive 
Response 
Factor 2 – 
Proactive 
Response 
1 .497 .097 
16 .452 .090 
12 .442 .333 
5 .410 .162 
15 .388 .228 
8 .373 .328 
10 .366 .332 
23 .315 .262 
6 -.136 .814 
4 -.289 .797 
14 -.052 .779 
11 .054 .682 
7 .168 .549 
26 .115 .542 
21 .093 .524 
17 .107 .488 
49 .065 .487 
19 .173 .480 
50 .051 .475 
22 .164 .395 
18 .122 .391 
13 .321 .375 
3 .333 .344 
42 .138 .273 
38 .094 .231 
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Continued Table 1.  Factor loadings of items from the Fear of Guilt Scale. 
 
Group 2 (N = 874) 
Item 
No. 
Factor 1 –  
Reactive 
Response 
Factor 2 – 
Proactive 
Response 
39 .838 -.133 
28 .833 -.133 
33 .832 -.184 
29 .814 -.055 
30 .792 -.028 
35 .754 -.146 
40 .747 .036 
24 .735 .003 
34 .727 -.051 
32 .713 .094 
25 .706 .071 
2 .674 -.164 
41 .667 -.030 
37 .652 -.142 
44 .647 .099 
47 .640 .035 
45 .625 .053 
20 .610 .119 
9 .601 .040 
43 .585 .218 
36 .583 .198 
27 .561 .288 
12 .548 .231 
31 .543 .128 
48 .539 .199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item 
No. 
Factor 1 –  
Reactive 
Response 
Factor 2 – 
Proactive 
Response 
46 .534 .003 
1 .525 .042 
5 .426 .121 
13 .403 .186 
15 .401 .315 
3 .400 .273 
16 .394 .123 
8 .377 .289 
10 .343 .316 
23 .328 .311 
42 .291 .269 
11 .046 .731 
14 -.048 .697 
4 -.230 .690 
6 -.119 .657 
26 .039 .598 
18 .113 .581 
21 .149 .567 
19 .212 .559 
7 .227 .528 
50 .119 .524 
49 .148 .520 
17 .169 .485 
38 .004 .458 
22 .301 .395 
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Table 2.  Correlations between FOGS factors and measures of related constructs completed by 
Group 1 (N = 366). 
 
GI State 
Guilt 
GI Trait 
Guilt 
GI Total 
Guilt 
DASS 
Stress 
DASS 
Anxiety 
OCI  
Total 
FOGS Reactive 
Response 
.481 .568 .573 .425 .459 .518 
FOGS Proactive 
Response 
.264 .355 .384 .232 .215 .204 
*All correlations are significant at the p < .01 level. 
 
Table 3.  Correlations between FOGS factors and measures of weakly related constructs. 
 
Group 1 (N = 366) Group 2 (N = 874) 
DASS 
Depression 
IPIP 
Neuroticism 
GI Moral 
Standards 
SPIN 
Total 
LSAS 
Total 
FOGS Reactive 
Response 
.383 .427 .218 .416 .317 
FOGS Proactive 
Response 
.179 .179 .228 .215 .209 
*All correlations are significant at the p < .01 level. 
 
Table 4.  Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting OCD symptom severity. 
 R
2 
R
2Δ Sig. F 
Δ 
β Sig. β Zero-order 
correlation 
Semi-partial 
correlation 
Step 1 .45 .45 .00     
Neuroticism (IPIP-N)    .03 .65 .43 .02 
Depression (DASS)    -.05 .47 -.04 -.03 
Anxiety (DASS)    .42 .00 .34 .25 
Stress (DASS)    .16 .02 .58 .09 
Step 2 .46 .01 .14     
State Guilt (GI)    -.07 .33 .40 -.04 
Trait Guilt (GI)    .08 .27 .45 .04 
Rigid Moral Standards (GI)    -.02 .71 .07 -.01 
Step 3 .51 .05 .00     
FOGS Reactive Response    .35 .00 .51 .22 
FOGS Proactive Response    -.17 .00 .21 -.12 
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Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to operationalize and identify the core features of fear of 
guilt, develop and assess the validity of a measure of fear of guilt in OCD, and elucidate the 
relationship between fear of guilt and OCD.  To that effect, the FOGS was developed and 
administered to two large samples of undergraduate students.  Analyses were then conducted to 
determine the factor structure, internal consistency, and validity of the scale. 
 Results of the exploratory factor analysis suggest a two-factor structure for the fear of 
guilt construct, as measured by the FOGS.  The Reactive Response factor captures the drive to 
atone or punish oneself following feelings of guilt, as well as one’s beliefs about the importance 
of guilt.   The Proactive Response factor reflects efforts to pre-emptively prevent or minimise 
guilt.  These two factors are consistent with the latter two constructs proposed while developing 
the scale.  Items from the third proposed factor, the belief in overvalued importance and meaning 
of guilt, were distributed between the two extracted factors, but most of the items from this 
proposed factor were found to load more highly on the Reactive Response factor.   
The two subscales and the total FOGS score were expected to correlate with one another, 
due to the use of a non-orthogonal factor extraction method, and findings indicate that all three 
scales are, in fact, strongly correlated with one another.  The FOGS also showed excellent 
reliability overall, and both the Reactive Response and Proactive Response subscales 
demonstrated high internal consistency.  These findings were consistent and virtually identical 
across the two different participant groups. 
 The FOGS also demonstrated good convergent validity.  Correlations between fear of 
guilt and related measures of guilt, anxiety, and OCD symptomatology ranged from .4 to .6 for 
Reactive Responses and .2 to .4 for Proactive Responses.  The Proactive Response factor was 
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less strongly correlated with these related constructs than expected.  Thus, perhaps the tendency 
to act proactively to minimise or preclude oneself from guilt, due to one’s fear of guilt, may in 
fact be successful and allow individuals to feel less state guilt, trait guilt, and anxiety, and 
perform fewer OC behaviours than expected.  Alternatively, this might suggest that proactive 
responses are, in fact, performed before the anxiety and stress associated with guilt take place 
and, therefore, tap into slightly different constructs than guilt, anxiety, or OC phenomena. 
Additionally, the FOGS was able to discriminate fear of guilt from more weakly related 
constructs, such as depression, neuroticism, social anxiety, and rigid moral standards.  
Correlations between these measures and Reactive Responses ranged from .2 to .4, while 
Proactive Response factor correlations with the same scales were .2.  However, correlations 
between the Reactive Response factor and discriminant measures – in particular, neuroticism and 
social anxiety – were stronger than expected.  This might be accounted for if the FOGS also 
captures emotional reactivity to stress, as in neuroticism, and if the threat of guilt, a significant 
and feared feeling, poses as an emotional stressor to which the individual must react.  
Additionally, social concerns may be inherent in fear of guilt – that is, individuals worry that 
others will perceive them as guilty and find this anxiety intolerable – thus mapping well onto the 
fear of negative evaluation that is characteristic of social phobia.  This would much resemble the 
significant relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and OCD symptoms described 
by Bhar and Kyrios (1999).  Overall, these patterns of correlations suggest that, as hypothesised, 
the FOGS is related to measures of anxiety, guilt, depression, neuroticism, and OCD symptom 
severity, but the FOGS is not redundant with these measures. 
 Furthermore, fear of guilt, as measured by the FOGS, significantly predicted the severity 
of current OCD symptoms after levels of state and trait guilt, depression, anxiety, and 
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neuroticism.  Beta coefficients for the two FOGS factors indicate that they have different 
relationships with OCD symptomatology.  Greater reactive responses are predictive of more 
severe OCD symptoms, whereas nonclinical individuals scoring higher on the Proactive 
Response subscale are likely to experience fewer OCD symptoms, perhaps due to successful 
deployment of strategies to ameliorate situations that would otherwise lead to guilty feelings.  
Moreover, as predicted, trait and state guilt did not significantly predict severity of symptoms. 
 In sum, study findings suggest that fear of guilt, but not trait or state guilt, is predictive of 
OCD severity and may thus be a mechanism through which obsessions and compulsions can be 
understood.  However, results of this study are limited by the nonclinical participant sample; 
future studies should therefore assess the validity and predictive power of the scale using clinical 
OCD and other anxiety disorder populations.  Further research is also needed to determine the 
test-retest reliability of the scale and to replicate the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
FOGS when more specific measures than those administered in this study are used to control for 
anxiety, depression, guilt, and neuroticism.  Nevertheless, the FOGS has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties, and its two-factor structure appears to validly and reliably measure of 
fear of guilt in the context of OCD. 
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Study 2: Does Fear of Guilt Predict a More Cautious Decision-Making Style? 
No research has been conducted on mechanisms which may explicate the link between 
fear of guilt and OCD symptoms.  We posit that perseveration can be explained through a 
cautious decision-making style and feelings of uncertainty, which are driven by the feared 
feeling of guilt.  That is, individuals with OCD are higher in fear of guilt and have more 
difficulty determining that they will no longer be culpable for harm, while simultaneously 
finding it more important for them to know.   These fears drive these individuals to be more 
cautious and/or doubt themselves more, and they perseverate until they feel that they will not be 
held guilty for harm. 
Some research indicates that individuals with OCD do, in fact, tend to be indecisive, 
requiring more information before making decisions (Foa et al., 2003) and taking longer to 
complete tasks (Summerfeldt et al., 1998).  However, other research suggests they take the same 
amount of time as control participants to deliberate when making decisions about moral 
dilemmas (Franklin et al., 2009).  Thus, this study aimed first to determine whether fear of guilt 
evokes caution in decision-making.  In particular, one aim was to clarify whether greater fear of 
guilt leads individuals to require more information and more time before making a decision, 
especially when it is not clear which option is the “right” choice.   
Moreover, fear of guilt may orient people to potential harm, but it is difficult to know 
whether one course of action may lead to more harm than other.  Consequently, even after 
having made a decision, it may be possible for individuals to continue to doubt that they have 
made the right decision.  This study's second aim was therefore to explore whether individuals 
who have greater fear of guilt, and are particularly sensitive to revealing possible incompetence 
in moral behaviour, experience greater feelings of doubt and discomfort about the decisions they 
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make.  More specifically, would greater fear of guilt drive individuals to experience more 
difficulty when making decisions, less satisfaction with decisions made, and less confidence in 
having made the right decision? 
Furthermore, since the main hypothesised concern in those who excessively fear guilt is 
not the probability of harm itself but the thought of being held responsible for that harm, the 
study aimed, thirdly, to elucidate whether greater fear of guilt leads individuals to prefer certain 
types of information over others.  For example, these individuals may find that knowing others’ 
opinions (i.e., how others would behave in the same situation), rather than relying on their own 
appraisal of the facts, allows them to feel that they have shared the responsibility (e.g., “I chose 
option A because my mother said it was the better option”) and thus decreases the possibility of 
culpability in the event of a negative outcome.  Thus, the third aim of the study was to determine 
if, given the opportunity, individuals with elevated fear of guilt will prefer information from 
specific sources – namely, others’ opinions – which would absolve them of some guilt in case 
they make a wrong decision (e.g., “It’s not my fault, because my mother said it was the better 
option”). 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants in this study were 63 undergraduate students enrolled in the introductory 
psychology course at the University of Waterloo.  Participants were invited to complete the study 
for course credit based on scores above or below one standard deviation on the short version of 
the FOGS (FOGS-SV; i.e., Total FOGS-SV score < 60 or > 100).  The mean participant age was 
20 (SD = 2.97 years), and the sample was 63.5% female. 
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Procedure 
 Participants were recruited based on scores from the FOGS-SV, which was completed 
with several other screener questionnaires as part of mass testing procedures.  Participants were 
selected from both ends of the FOGS-SV score distribution (i.e., high and low in fear of guilt on 
the screener scale) in order to increase the probability of obtaining greater variance and range in 
FOGS scores, given that their scores on the full FOGS were likely to regress toward the mean.  
All participants completed five steps in this study: baseline measures, a stove task that afforded 
an opportunity to activate state fear of guilt, state fear of guilt induction or no induction 
(randomly assigned), a decision-making task, and ratings of the decision-making experience.  
Please refer to Figure 1 for a visual depiction of study procedures. 
 First, informed consent was obtained, and participants completed baseline questionnaires 
measuring trait fear of guilt (FOGS), presence and severity of OCD symptoms (Vancouver 
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory), and state affect (Positive Affect and Negative Affect 
Schedule, PANAS). These questionnaires were included to help determine whether participants 
assigned to the different fear of guilt induction groups differed in trait characteristics and to 
examine the various contributions of fear of guilt and state affect to decision-making style. 
Second, participants were given a description and demonstration of the stove task, asked 
to complete a second PANAS (“pre-stove task PANAS”) and five visual analogue scales (“pre-
stove task VAS,” see Measures below), and then video recorded while completing the stove task.  
In this complex stove task, the indicator light was covered and all knobs were removed so that 
participants were unable to determine visually whether any burners were on.  Participants were 
then given one knob with which they could adjust the four burners to various levels in specified 
sequences.  If completed correctly, all four burners would be off at the end of the task; if 
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performed incorrectly, some of the burners could be left on.  Participants then placed a pot of dry 
rice on the top right burner and left the room to complete the next phase of the study.  This stove 
task is based on an experimental checking paradigm by Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault (2008), 
but differs in that there is a real possibility of causing harm if the task is not completed properly 
(i.e., burning the dry rice and starting a fire if the burner is left on).  As well, participants were 
left to complete the task alone and were informed that the experimenter would not return to the 
room; therefore, participants had greater responsibility for harm that might have occurred as a 
result of improper task completion.   
 Third, participants were randomised to either have state fear of guilt induced or not.  
Those who had fear of guilt induced received a comment from the experimenter (“I hope you 
turned off all the burners; otherwise, I’ll get in trouble”) designed to trigger doubts about not 
having completed the task correctly and increase the potential for guilt (i.e., participants may feel 
culpable if the experimenter were to get in trouble for their poor performance).  Those who did 
not have fear of guilt induced received no comment.  All participants completed a third PANAS 
and the same set of VAS (“post-stove task PANAS and VAS”). 
 Fourth, all participants were introduced to the computerised decision-making (DM) task 
and given measures to complete prior to the task (“pre-DM task PANAS and VAS”).  This DM 
task is based on Foa and colleagues’ (2003) experimental paradigm, which explored clinical 
OCD participants’ decision-making strategies in hypothetical scenarios.  This DM task design, in 
particular, was chosen because the deliberation process is left open-ended, and participants are 
left to determine for themselves how much time and information they need before they make 
their decision.  However, the DM task designed for this study involved the creation of original 
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scenarios and modifications of Foa et al.’s design in order to better standardise the task, remove 
variance from possible confounding factors, and realistically raise the stakes. 
In our DM task, twelve hypothetical scenarios were presented to participants; each 
scenario involved a choice between two options (A or B) and a threat of a negative outcome 
should the participant make the wrong choice.  One piece of information was always provided, 
and participants could either choose to receive additional information (for a maximum of four 
total pieces) or to make their decision after receiving each piece of information, thus completing 
the scenario.  In this way, participants could choose how much information they wanted and how 
long to spend deliberating before making a decision.  This design differs from that of Foa et al. 
(2003) in that each scenario includes the threat of a negative outcome, and all information about 
the scenarios provided is standardised to come from four specific types of sources, rather than 
being attributed to varied and assorted sources.   
Unbeknownst to participants, the four pieces of information available for each scenario 
fell into four specific categories: small-scale fact (e.g., a difference in cost), large-scale fact (e.g., 
findings of a large study), small-scale opinion (e.g., a parent’s recommendation), and large-scale 
opinion (e.g., findings of a poll of experts).  The information was ambiguous, suggesting only 
slight advantages, and counterbalanced such that both facts and both opinions – and, similarly, 
both small-scale and both large-scale pieces – were never in agreement that A or B was the better 
option.  In order to become familiarised with the task, participants completed a practice scenario 
before the 12 scenarios were presented.  The DM task was programmed on e-prime, which 
allowed for the randomisation of the order in which scenarios and information were presented, as 
well as the measurement of decision-making duration through reaction time data (i.e., time spent 
deliberating each slide).   
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Last, all participants were presented with each scenario and decision they had made and 
then asked to complete several sets of ratings about how they had felt about their decisions and 
how helpful each piece of information had been, using the Decision-Making Process Rating 
Questionnaire.  Finally, each participant completed a post-DM task PANAS and VAS, and then 
was debriefed. 
Measures 
Fear of Guilt Scale, Short Version (FOGS-SV) 
 This scale consists of 20 items, the 10 highest loading items on each of the two factors 
from the full Fear of Guilt Scale.  The FOGS-SV is rated on a 7-point Likert scale and was used 
as a screening tool to measure trait fear of guilt. 
Fear of Guilt Scale (FOGS; Chiang, Purdon, & Radomsky, 2012) 
 The revised, 48-item FOGS from Study 1 was used to measure trait levels of fear of guilt.  
See Study 1 for additional information about the psychometric properties of the inventory. 
 Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson, Radomsky, Rachman, 
Shafran, Sawchuk, & Hakstian, 2004) 
 This 55-item scale measures the frequency and severity of several common OCD-type 
thoughts and behaviours experienced by individuals.  Participants rate their agreement with items 
on a 5-point Likert scale, and items load onto six subscales, or factors (Contamination, Checking, 
Obsessions, Hoarding, Just Right experiences, and Indecisiveness), and one total scale score.  
The VOCI has also demonstrated strong psychometric properties, such as good internal 
consistency, high test-retest reliability, and good convergent and discriminant validity 
(Thordarson et al., 2004).  
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Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
The PANAS asks respondents to rate, on a 5-point Likert scale, the extent to which they 
are currently experiencing (i.e., as state affect) ten positively valenced emotions and ten 
negatively valenced emotions.  The ratings are totaled such that two scales are produced – 
positive affect and negative affect.  The PANAS has been widely used as a measure of state 
affect, and it has consistently demonstrated excellent psychometric properties (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988).    
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) 
  At baseline, before and after the stove task, and before and after the DM task, 
participants were asked to rate, on a 150-mm line, where they fell on five state 
variables.  Individuals were asked to consider the likelihood of harm, severity of harm, 
responsibility for harm, guilt, and fear of guilt, should harm occur as a result of their 
performance on the task (i.e., not turning off the stove correctly on the stove task and making the 
wrong decision in the DM task).  The baseline set of VAS pertained to the participant’s projected 
performance on the stove task.  Scores were based on the measured length of the line, in mm, 
from the furthest left edge to the participant’s vertical mark on the line. 
Decision-Making Process Ratings Questionnaire 
This questionnaire consists of five items to be completed for each of the 12 scenarios in 
the DM task.  For each scenario, participants rated on an 11-point Likert scale (“0=not at all” and 
“10=extremely”) how difficult it had been to make that decision, how satisfied they were with 
that decision, and how confident they were that they had made the right decision.  As well, 
participants were shown all the pieces of information they had received for each scenario.  They 
then ranked the pieces of information in order of how important each had been in helping them 
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make their decision (i.e., first, second, etc.) and provided a rating of how much weight each piece 
had contributed to their decision-making (i.e., two pieces of information with equal bearing on 
the final decision would be rated 50%-50%).   
Data Analyses 
In order to determine whether or not the fear of guilt induction was successful, a 
manipulation check was performed by conducting a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(repeated measures ANOVA) comparing the fear of guilt vs. no induction groups before and 
after the manipulation.  A series of hierarchical regression analyses were also performed to 
determine whether study variables – most notably, state and trait fear of guilt – could predict 
how carefully participants mulled over decisions and how uncertain they reported feeling about 
their decisions.  Correlation analyses were also performed to ascertain whether there was any 
relationship between fear of guilt and the type of information preferred by participants. 
Hypotheses 
1. Higher fear of guilt evokes greater caution in decision-making, which can be 
demonstrated through objective indicators of cautious deliberation, such as requesting 
more information and taking more time to make decisions. 
 
2. Higher fear of guilt evokes feelings of doubt about decisions made, which are evident 
through subjective ratings of the decision-making process, such as greater difficulty 
making decisions, less satisfaction with decisions made, and less confidence in 
having made right decision. 
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3. Individuals who are higher in fear of guilt will prefer to receive additional 
information in the form of others’ opinions over other types of information, such as 
facts.  Thus, higher fear of guilt will be associated with a greater frequency of this 
preferred type of information (as they persist in requesting more information until 
they receive this specific source of information), greater importance in the decision-
making process assigned to informative opinions, and a larger percentage of the 
decision made attributed to opinions.  
 
Results 
Demographics 
Results from a chi-squared test and several t-tests suggested that participants randomised 
to the fear of guilt induction group (i.e., the group that received the comment) were not 
significantly different from those randomised to the no induction group (i.e., the group that 
received no comment) on various demographic variables and baseline measures.  Specifically, 
the two groups did not significantly differ on participant gender, age, level of trait fear of guilt, 
endorsement of OCD symptomatology, and baseline positive and negative affect.  See Table 5 
for more detailed results. 
Manipulation Check 
To determine whether the manipulation was successful for those randomised to have fear 
of guilt induced, the two groups were compared on their ratings of state fear of guilt before and 
after the induction task.  Since the induction task in our study included both the complex stove 
task and the comment following the stove task, participants’ pre- and post-stove task VAS 
ratings were compared.  A successful fear of guilt induction would be expected to result in: a) no 
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significant difference in pre- and post-stove task fear of guilt VAS ratings for the no induction 
group; b) significantly higher post-stove task fear of guilt VAS ratings than pre-stove task for the 
induction group; c) no significant difference in fear of guilt VAS between the no induction and 
induction groups pre-stove task; and d) significantly higher post-stove task VAS ratings for the 
induction group than no induction group. 
 A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to compare state fear of guilt ratings 
before and after the induction (i.e., pre- and post-stove task VAS ratings of fear of guilt) between 
the fear of guilt induction and no induction groups.   Results suggest that fear of guilt did not 
change significantly over time, F(1,59) = 1.79, p = .19, nor did they differ significantly between 
groups F(1,59) = .02, p = .88.  The interaction between group and time of rating was also not 
significant, F(1,59) = .41, p = .53.   
 Another repeated-measures ANOVA was completed to determine whether the 
manipulation had resulted in any change in state guilt, rather than state fear of guilt.  Again, guilt 
ratings did not change significantly over time, F(1,59) = .04, p = .84, nor did the groups differ 
significantly in ratings of guilt, F(1,59) = 1.18, p = .28.  Although the interaction of group by 
time appeared to be significant, F(1,59) = 5.77, p = .02, post-hoc t-tests indicate that the 
induction and no induction groups were not significantly different in state guilt before the stove 
task (t[1,59] = -.311, p = .76) or after the induction task (t[1,59] = -1.86, p = .07).  Thus, the 
induction task did not result in any significant increase in fear of guilt post-stove task, nor did it 
result in significantly higher fear of guilt ratings compared to the no induction group. 
 Since the fear of guilt manipulation was unsuccessful (i.e., the Comment and No 
Comment groups are effectively the same in state guilt and fear of guilt after the induction task), 
all subsequent analyses do not differentiate between the fear of guilt induction and no induction 
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groups.  Rather, continuous data, such as trait fear of guilt (through baseline FOGS scores) and 
state fear of guilt (pre-task fear of guilt VAS ratings) are used in the following analyses. 
1) Does higher fear of guilt evoke caution in decision-making?  
 To determine whether higher trait or state fear of guilt could predict greater caution in 
decision-making, taking into account ratings of state responsibility and likelihood of harm, two 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted.  Caution in decision-making was 
operationalized in two ways: requesting more information and taking a longer time before 
making decisions.  Therefore, the dependent variables (DVs) for the two different regression 
analyses were, respectively, total amount of information requested in the whole task and total 
time taken to complete all of the scenarios.   
In both sets of analyses, five independent variables (IVs) were entered as predictors on 
two steps: FOGS Reactive and Proactive scales (Step 1), followed by pre-DM VAS ratings for 
state fear of guilt, responsibility, and harm likelihood (Step 2). In the first regression analysis, the 
five predictor variables did not significantly predict the total number of pieces of information 
requested across all scenarios.  The model was not significant, R
2
 = .07, F(5,55) = 0.83, p = .54.  
Similarly, the second regression analysis did not yield significant results, with the variance in the 
predictor variables not accounting for a significant amount of the variance in total time taken to 
complete all scenarios, R
2
 = .10, F(5,55) = 1.27, p = .29.  Detailed results are displayed in Tables 
6 and 7. 
2) Does higher fear of guilt evoke feelings of doubt about decisions made? 
Three additional sets of hierarchical regression analyses were performed to determine 
whether fear of guilt could significantly predict feelings of doubt or uncertainty when making 
decisions.  Feelings of doubt about decisions made were measured after the DM task using 3 
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dependent variables: 1) ratings of the difficulty of each decision, 2) ratings of one’s satisfaction 
with each decision, and 3) ratings of one’s confidence in having made the right decision.  In each 
of these regression analyses, the same predictor variables were once again entered in the same 
order: trait fear of guilt in Step 1 (FOGS Reactive Response and Proactive Response scales), and 
then state fear of guilt, responsibility for harm, and harm likelihood in Step 2 (VAS ratings). 
In the hierarchical regression analysis in which the five IVs were used to predict the 
average difficulty of decision – averaged across all 12 scenarios – the model was significant at R2 
= .25, F(5,54) = 3.57, p = .006.  Together, the trait fear of guilt variables in Step 1 accounted for 
11% of the variance in the average rating of difficulty (p = .04).  Similarly, the set of state 
variables in Step 2 uniquely explained 14% of the variance in the DV (p = .02).  At an individual 
variable level, only the state fear of guilt VAS (p = .05) significantly predicted the average 
difficulty rating; this relationship is positive.  While the Reactive Response variable significantly 
predicted the DV when first entered, it lost statistical significance when the state variables were 
entered (p = .02 to .11), likely because some of the variance originally explained by trait fear of 
guilt was later captured by the state fear of guilt variable.  See Table 8 for full results. 
The regression model in which trait fear of guilt, state fear of guilt, responsibility for 
harm, and harm likelihood were used to predict the average rating of satisfaction with decision 
was also significant, R
2
 = .32, F(5,54) = 5.02, p = .001.  Step 1 (trait fear of guilt) variables again 
accounted for a statistically significant 19% of the variance in average satisfaction rating (p = 
.002), while Step 2 variables (state fear of guilt, responsibility, and harm likelihood) explained an 
additional unique 12% of the variance (p = .03).  Three individual predictor variables 
significantly predicted the average satisfaction rating: Reactive Response (p = .003), 
responsibility for harm (p = .03), and likelihood of harm (p = .04). 
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Results of zero-order and semi-partial correlation analyses of the predictor variables with 
the DV indicate that the responsibility for harm variable is being suppressed by the two state 
variables also being entered on the same step – harm likelihood and state fear of guilt.  The zero-
order correlation between the responsibility rating and average satisfaction is -.03 (p = .85), but 
the semi-partial correlation, which holds the other two IVs constant, is .25 (p = .07).  Additional 
correlation analyses suggest that while responsibility, on its own, is positively related to one’s 
satisfaction with decision, responsibility for harm also shares variance with the fear of guilt VAS 
and harm likelihood VAS, outside of their relationships with satisfaction with one’s decisions.  
However, both fear of guilt and harm likelihood VAS variables have negative relationships with 
the criterion variable, and these negative relationships suppress the positive relationship between 
responsibility and decision satisfaction, because of shared variance between the three IVs.  See 
Table 9 for regression results and correlations. 
In addition, when the five IVs were entered in a hierarchical regression analysis to predict 
the average rating of confidence in having made the right decision, the model was significant at 
R
2
 = .34, F(5,54) = 5.65, p < .001.  When the trait fear of guilt variables were first entered, they 
explained 17% of the variance in average confidence rating (p = .005), and when state variables 
were added, they explained an additional, significant 17 % of the variance in the DV (p = .005).  
Nearly all IVs are significant, individual predictors in the regression equation: Reactive 
Response (p = .006), Proactive Response (p = .02), state responsibility (p = .02), and state harm 
likelihood (p = .005). 
Similar to correlation analysis results from the average satisfaction regression the 
responsibility VAS was suppressed by the other two VAS variables in the same manner.  
Whereas the zero-order correlation of responsibility with average confidence was -.02 (p = .89), 
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the semi-partial correlation was .27 (p = .04).  Thus, the same relationships exist in that 
responsibility and confidence are somewhat positively related (so as beliefs in responsibility for 
harm increase, so too does one’s confidence in having made the right decision), but shared 
variance exists between one’s feelings of responsibility for harm, beliefs about likelihood of 
harm, and state fear of guilt.  Therefore, the latter two variables’ negative relationships with the 
criterion variable suppress that of the responsibility variable, making it appear that no 
relationship exists. 
Reactive Response suppression of Proactive Response was also replicated here -  the 
zero-order correlation between Proactive Response and average confidence is effectively zero (r 
= .03, p = .81), but the semi-partial correlation is .27 (p = .02) .  As in Study 1, Proactive 
Response is positively related to the criterion variable – in this case, confidence in having made 
the right decision – but shares some variance with Reactive Response, which is negatively 
related to the DV.  The nature of these relationships would suggest that Proactive Response is 
not correlated with confidence in decision-making, though the variance unique to Proactive 
Response (when holding Reactive Response steady) is actually weakly positively related to the 
DV.  Full results are presented in Table 10. 
3) Does higher fear of guilt lead individuals to prefer certain types of information over others? 
To determine if participants exhibited preferences for certain types of information over 
others, several correlation analyses were performed.  For each of the four types of information, 
trait fear of guilt (i.e., FOGS Total score) was correlated with three indicators of preference: 
average frequency of that type of information over the course of the DM task, average rank of 
importance ascribed to that type, and average weight attributed to that type of information in the 
DM process.  Please refer to Table 11 for all 12 correlations.  Only one correlation – that of 
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FOGS Total and the average rank attributed to small-scale facts – was significantly different 
from zero (r = .29, p = .02).  All other correlations were not statistically significant.  The 
correlation of fear of guilt with average small fact rank was compared to the other non-
independent correlations of fear of guilt and average rank of the other three types of information 
(for dependent correlations measured on the same subject, as described by DeCoster [2007]).  
Results suggested that none of the correlations were significantly different from that of fear of 
guilt with average small fact rank (vs. large-scale fact, z = .70, p = .48; vs. small-scale opinion, z 
= 1.60, p = .11; vs. large-scale opinion, z = 1.5 , p = .13).  
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Table 5.  Differences between fear of guilt induction and no induction groups on demographic 
variables and baseline measures. 
 
Fear of Guilt 
Induction Group 
Mean (SD) 
No Induction 
Group Mean 
(SD) 
t p-value 
Gender 58% female 70% female χ
2 =  1.05 .31 
Age 20.45 (3.70) 19.63 (1.83) -1.10 .28 
Trait Fear of Guilt 
(FOGS Total) 
185.00 (42.93) 179.07 (45.10) -.53 .60 
OCD Symptoms 
(VOCI Total) 
40.24 (31.24) 46.80 (34.39) .79 .43 
Baseline Positive 
Affect (PANAS) 
21.16 (6.27) 24.13 (6.86) 1.77 .08 
Baseline Negative 
Affect (PANAS) 
14.12 (5.71) 14.87 (5.06) .55 .59 
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Figure 1.  Visual depiction of study procedures. 
 
  
Step 1: Baseline Measures 
Step 2: Intro to Stove Task 
 Pre-Stove Task VAS, PANAS 
 Complete Stove Task 
Step 3: Receive Comment 
 Post-Stove Task VAS, PANAS 
Step 3: Receive No Comment 
 Post-Stove Task VAS, PANAS 
Step 4: Intro to Decision-Making Task 
 Pre-DM Task VAS, PANAS 
 Complete DM Task 
Step 5: Decision-Making Process Ratings 
 Post-DM Task VAS, PANAS 
Participants randomised to fear of 
guilt induction 
Participants randomised to no fear of 
guilt induction 
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Table 6. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting total amount of information 
requested in decision-making task. 
 R
2 
R
2Δ Sig. F 
Δ 
β Sig. β Zero-order 
correlation 
Semi-partial 
correlation 
Step 1 .04 .04 .28     
FOGS Reactive Response    .26 .15 .20 .19 
FOGS Proactive Response    -.05 .77 .10 -.04 
Step 2 .07 .03 .67     
State Responsibility (VAS)    -.18 .25 -.11 -.15 
State Fear of Guilt (VAS)    -.03 .86 .01 -.02 
State Harm Likelihood (VAS)    .07 .65 .04 .06 
 
 
Table 7.  Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting total time taken to complete all 
scenarios in decision-making task. 
 R
2 
R
2Δ Sig. F 
Δ 
β Sig. β Zero-order 
correlation 
Semi-partial 
correlation 
Step 1 .01 .01 .69     
FOGS Reactive Response    -.04 .84 .05 -.03 
FOGS Proactive Response    .17 .33 .11 .13 
Step 2 .10 .09 .15     
State Responsibility (VAS)    -.28 .07 -.17 -.24 
State Fear of Guilt (VAS)    -.11 .46 -.07 -.10 
State Harm Likelihood (VAS)    .29 .07 .12 .24 
 
 
Table 8.  Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting average difficulty of decision. 
 R
2 
R
2Δ Sig. F 
Δ 
β Sig. β Zero-order 
correlation 
Semi-partial 
correlation 
Step 1 .11 .11 .04     
FOGS Reactive Response    .26 .11 .31 .19 
FOGS Proactive Response    -.15 .36 .12 -.10 
Step 2 .25 .14 .02     
State Responsibility (VAS)    -.07 .61 .18 -.06 
State Fear of Guilt (VAS)    .28 .05 .40 .24 
State Harm Likelihood (VAS)    .24 .09 .37 .20 
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Table 9. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting average satisfaction with decision. 
 R
2 
R
2Δ Sig. F 
Δ 
β Sig. β Zero-order 
correlation 
Semi-partial 
correlation 
Step 1 .19 .19 .002     
FOGS Reactive Response    -.47 .003 -.39 -.34 
FOGS Proactive Response    .24 .11 -.11 .18 
Step 2 .31 .12 .03     
State Responsibility (VAS)    .29 .03 .01 .25 
State Fear of Guilt (VAS)    -.20 .14 -.31 -.17 
State Harm Likelihood (VAS)    -.29 .04 -.32 -.24 
 
 
Table 10. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting average confidence in having 
made the right decision. 
 R
2 
R
2Δ Sig. F 
Δ 
β Sig. β Zero-order 
correlation 
Semi-partial 
correlation 
Step 1 .17 .17 .005     
FOGS Reactive Response    -.43 .006 -.29 -.31 
FOGS Proactive Response    .36 .02 .03 .27 
Step 2 .34 .17 .005     
State Responsibility (VAS)    .32 .02 .02 .27 
State Fear of Guilt (VAS)    -.18 .16 -.28 -.16 
State Harm Likelihood (VAS)    -.39 .05 -.39 -.32 
 
 
Table 11.  Correlations between trait fear of guilt and indicators of preference for each type of 
information in the DM task. 
 Small Fact 
Frequency 
Large Fact 
Frequency 
Indiv. Opinion 
Frequency 
Mass Opinion 
Frequency 
FOGS Total .19 .17 .14 .20 
 Average Small 
Fact Rank 
Average Large 
Fact Rank 
Average Indiv. 
Opinion Rank 
Average Mass 
Opinion Rank 
FOGS Total .29* .21 .06 .10 
 Average Small 
Fact Weight 
Average Large 
Fact Weight 
Average Indiv. 
Opinion Weight 
Average Mass 
Opinion Weight 
FOGS Total -.25 -.15 -.04 -.20 
*Correlation significant at p < .05 level. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether fear of guilt predicts caution in 
decision-making, evokes feelings of doubt when deliberating, and influences individuals’ 
preferences for information when trying to make decisions.  To explore this, half of the study 
participants were randomised to have fear of guilt induced by making a comment instilling doubt 
in their performance and alerting them to possible negative outcomes should they not have 
completed the task properly.  The other half received no comment (no fear of guilt induction).  
Both groups then completed the computerised DM task and rated the DM process. 
Contrary to expectations, results indicated that the fear of guilt manipulation was 
unsuccessful, since the two groups – one with fear of guilt induced and one without any 
induction – did not differ significantly in change in fear of guilt or guilt ratings following the 
manipulation.  That is, the two groups were feeling effectively the same levels of fear of guilt 
and state guilt despite our attempted manipulation.  There are several possibilities as to why the 
manipulation did not work.  First, it is possible that the experimenter’s comment was too subtle, 
and the suggestion that they may have forgotten to turn off the stove was not enough to activate 
guilty feelings or enhance their fear of guilt alone.  Since participants were left alone to complete 
the stove task, they may also have simply checked the burners to their own satisfaction before 
receiving the comment, thus achieving certainty on their own that they had turned off all burners.  
Thus, in spite of any warnings of responsibility and possible harm, it may not have been possible 
for them to fear being guilty of not having turned off the stove properly. 
 Second, some participants also reported having ascribed responsibility for any potential 
negative outcome to the researcher (e.g., “It’s your study; you won’t let the building burn 
down”), so while they might feel some guilt, they wouldn’t fear being blamed, because they felt 
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that it was someone else’s responsibility.  As well, it is possible that it is simply difficult to tap 
into the construct, because it involves too subtle a differentiation of feelings for individuals to 
consciously rate.  For example, Harrison and colleagues (2012) found that, when confronted with 
moral dilemmas involving life and death situations, individuals with OCD and control 
participants rated scenarios as similarly emotionally provocative, but individuals with OCD 
exhibited significantly greater activation of brain areas typically associated with OCD 
behaviours.  Thus, while individuals with OCD did not subjectively rate moral dilemmas as more 
emotionally provocative, there is a significant difference in neural activation, suggesting that 
there may be a considerable divide between one’s perceived emotional experience and one’s 
awareness of it. Finally, it may simply have been the case that the stove task itself activated state 
fear of guilt in everyone. 
1) Does higher fear of guilt evoke caution in decision-making? 
 Study results indicated that greater fear of guilt did not, as hypothesised, evoke caution in 
decision-making.  Trait and state fear of guilt did not predict the total amount of information 
requested by individuals, nor did they predict the total time taken to complete decisions for all 
twelve scenarios, both of which are objective indicators of a cautious decision-making style.  
While no existing studies closely resemble the methods used in this study, these results were not 
consistent with what was expected, based on findings from related studies.  Mancini et al. (2004) 
found that participants who had fear of guilt and responsibility activated took longer to complete 
a visuospatial task and performed more checks.  As well, given that fear of guilt is significantly 
related to OCD symptomatology (see Study 1), it may be possible to extrapolate from DM 
studies using OC participants.  Findings are mixed, with Foa and colleagues (2003) reporting that 
the greater the OCD symptoms, the more information required and more time taken to make a 
48 
 
decisions, and Franklin et al. (2009) noting that OC and control participants did not differ in time 
taken to deliberate moral dilemmas. 
 The null finding with respect to the relationship between fear of guilt and total amount of 
information received may in part have been affected by ceiling effects.  The average number of 
pieces of information requested for a scenario was 3 (SD = .9), and it is not clear whether the 
variance in total number of pieces of information would have changed, or if some participants 
would have continued to request more information had they been offered a maximum of ten 
pieces of information, for example.  Additionally, all decisions involved hypothetical situations 
with no real repercussions.  Perhaps the scenarios were not realistic enough for participants to 
fear the hypothetical negative outcomes or to feel that situations tapped into their idiosyncratic 
OC concerns.  It is also worth mentioning that not all of the scenarios in the Foa study included a 
threat of possible harm; thus, this may have been a confounding variable that added variance into 
the significant relationship between OC phenomena and greater caution in decision-making. 
 Moreover, findings from Harkin and Mayes’ (2008) study may clarify the null results 
between time taken to complete decisions and fear of guilt.  In a sample of nonclinical 
participants, they found that response latencies for decisions about series of hypothetical 
statements were slower for high OC individuals than low OC individuals, but only when the 
statements were low in ambiguity.  In medium and high ambiguity situations, high and low OC 
individuals were comparable in response times.  They hypothesised that low OC individuals use 
quick, context-independent DM strategies in low ambiguity situations, whereas higher OC 
individuals persist with slower, more careful deliberation.  At higher levels of ambiguity, all 
individuals alike deliberate more carefully (Harkin & Mayes, 2008).  Given that all scenarios in 
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this study’s DM task were high in ambiguity, it is perhaps not surprising that there was no 
relationship between fear of guilt and objective indicators of cautious decision-making. 
2) Does higher fear of guilt evoke feelings of doubt about decisions made? 
 Our analyses suggested that greater fear of guilt does, as predicted, evoke feelings of 
doubt in decision-making.  Fear of guilt significantly predicted subjective ratings of difficulty 
making decisions, satisfaction with decisions, and confidence in having made the right decision.  
While trait fear of guilt, as measured by both FOGS factors, accounted for a significant amount 
of variance for each of these DVs, some measure of fear of guilt was also always a significant 
individual predictor of each DV, whether as a state fear of guilt VAS or as a subscale for the 
FOGS.  These findings support our second hypothesis and are, in turn, supported by several 
studies that note the significant relationship between doubting or difficulty trusting one’s internal 
senses and perseveration (Cougle et al., 2011; Lazarov et al, 2010; Summerfeldt, 2004; Wahl et 
al., 2008).   
Interestingly, it appears that not all aspects of fear of guilt are negatively associated with 
satisfaction with decisions.  In a DM study by Gangemi et al. (2007), they found that high-trait 
guilt individuals who had undergone a guilt induction tended to report greater dissatisfaction 
with their efforts to prevent harm in hypothetical situations after feeling guilty – though this 
relationship was not statistically significant – than did high trait-guilt individuals in the anxiety 
or control conditions.  This non-significant relationship matches well this study’s finding that 
Proactive Response lacked unique predictive power in predicting one’s satisfaction with one’s 
decisions. 
The state variables, which measured state fear of guilt and OC cognitions, such as 
responsibility for harm and likelihood of harm, also predicted greater feelings of doubt while 
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deliberating, over and above trait fear of guilt when they were entered into analyses as one 
group.  Thus, not only does fear of guilt lead individuals to mistrust their internal sense that they 
have made a good decision, but levels of OC-typical cognitions at the time of decision-making 
contribute to undermining participants’ certainty in having made the right choice. 
Patterns of correlations also suggested statistically complex relationships between 
variables of interest.  Further exploration indicated that state ratings for responsibility for harm 
and Proactive Response scores were each positively related with satisfaction and confidence 
ratings, but not difficulty ratings, in the DM task when controlling for other predictor variables.  
Thus, perhaps these two variables serve as protective factors in the DM process, allowing 
individuals to feel more secure in their decisions.  More specifically, feeling more responsible for 
harm may lead individuals to persist until they feel more certain about their decisions.  Proactive 
responses to fear of guilt may, as found in Study 1, be somewhat successful in helping 
individuals feel that they have prevented or minimised harm for which they might feel guilty, 
allowing them to better trust their internal sense that they made an appropriate decision.  
However, neither variable actually helps individuals find decisions less difficult.  
3) Does higher fear of guilt lead individuals to prefer certain types of information over others? 
 Third, it was hypothesised that individuals who are higher in fear of guilt would prefer to 
have information in the form of others’ opinions, as it would allow them to transfer responsibility 
in case of a negative outcome, circumventing any possible fears of being guilty.  However, we 
found that participants’ level of fear of guilt was not associated with greater preference for 
opinions than facts (or vice versa), as indicated by greater correlations between fear of guilt and 
frequency, ranked importance, or contributing weight in the DM process.  This null finding was 
not expected, but may perhaps be attributed to the fact that the sample was comprised of 
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undergraduate participants.  Due to the academic setting and students’ familiarity with studies, 
the participants may have lent more credence to facts than would be expected in a community 
sample or sample of clinical individuals.  This would have diminished any differences in 
preferences for specific information types.  Alternatively, it is possible that individuals who fear 
guilt find all types of information helpful in informing their decisions, because facts serve as 
external cues which they can use to help satisfy elevated evidence requirements (Lazarov et al., 
2010; Wahl et al,. 2008), and opinions help them share responsibility, thus allaying fears of guilt. 
 In conclusion, findings from our study suggest that fear of guilt, which brings about 
feelings of doubt when deliberating (e.g., when to stop a behaviour), is a possible explanatory 
mechanism by which individuals with OCD perseverate.  It is the case that interpretation of study 
results is limited by the use of nonclinical participants, especially from an undergraduate 
population, rather than individuals with OCD.  As well, participants were asked to 
retrospectively report on how they had felt during the DM process after having completed all 12 
scenarios, and ratings for each scenario may have been inaccurate or even biased by decisions 
that would have taken place between each scenario and the individual’s rating of that scenario.  
However, when designing the study, it was determined that asking participants to complete 
ratings after the completion of each scenario was not ideal, since it would explicitly call attention 
to their decision-making process, thus influencing and changing their decisions. Furthermore, as 
previously noted, all scenarios involved hypothetical dilemmas and repercussions.  Although 
scenarios were written to model common, relatable issues, it is possible that individuals might 
behave differently in the case of real-life problems or threat of real harm, thus creating 
differences in time taken or amount of information required to make a decision.   
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General Discussion 
Altogether, results from both studies suggest that fear of guilt significantly predicts the 
level of OCD symptoms in a nonclinical sample of undergraduate students.  Also, fear of guilt 
may be an explanatory mechanism for perseveration, because individuals do not want to feel 
guilty for harm caused and cannot know which course of action will lead to more harm.  Because 
fear of guilt undermines individuals’ trust in internal cues (e.g., that they may have made a 
decision properly or well), they lack a sense of knowing and feel doubt in their own decision-
making ability.  Since they cannot decide whether they are yet safe from culpability, individuals 
have difficulty knowing when to stop, whether in the process of deliberating or while performing 
some OC-type behaviour.  Therefore, individuals perseverate and may need to rely more on 
external cues or adopt subjective rules as stopping criteria.  Yet, our findings suggest that it is 
possible that proactive responses to feared guilt are somewhat successful in preventing guilty 
feelings and help individuals feel more certain in their decisions, though they may not make the 
actual decision feel easier. 
 Although fear of guilt may therefore play a significant role in the development and 
persistence of OCD, it is not clear from where this elevated fear of guilt would originate.  
Additionally, there is no research exploring why some individuals would have higher fear of 
guilt than others.  We propose that high parental psychological control in childhood causes 
individuals to develop elevated trait levels of fear of guilt, leaving them more vulnerable to 
developing OCD. 
 Parental psychological control is a well-researched construct from the parenting 
literature, and it has been defined as manipulative parenting behaviours that impede a child’s 
psychological and emotional development as an autonomous, independent being (e.g., Barber, 
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1996).  Frequently used parental psychological control strategies include (1) making parental 
love, attention, and care contingent on children’s compliance with parental rules and 
withdrawing love should standards not be met; (2) inducing anxiety in children to make them 
adhere to parental rules; (3) invalidating expressions of children’s internal states (e.g., thoughts, 
feelings, etc.); and (4) inducing guilt to coerce children into behaving in specific ways (Soenens 
& Vansteenkiste, 2010).   
Psychological control is distinct from behavioural control, which encompasses parental 
behaviours that are used to control and manage a child’s behaviour along two dimensions – 
discipline used to enforce rules and monitoring or awareness of the child’s activities.  Whereas 
behavioural control has consistently been linked to child externalizing problems, psychological 
control has more frequently been associated with internalising outcomes, such as anxiety and 
mood difficulties (Barber, 1996; Ballash, Leyfer, Buckley, & Woodruff-Borden, 2006).  These 
internalising difficulties have frequently been attributed to the child’s failure to develop a stable 
sense of self, independent from the parent (Barber, 1996).   
Several child studies support a specific link between parental psychological control and 
anxiety.  In a study by Messer and Beidel (1994), child anxiety was correlated with self-reported 
perception of parental control, and anxious children reported less promotion of independence by 
their parents.  Observer ratings of child-parent interactions, when completing challenging study 
tasks, also suggest that parents of anxious children are more intrusive, negative, and controlling 
than parents of non-anxious children (Greco & Morris, 2002; Hudson & Rapee, 2001).  
Additionally, compared to mothers of competent or aggressive children, mothers of anxious 
children are rated by observers as showing the highest levels of psychological control, including 
criticism, punishment, and intrusiveness (Dumas, LaFreniere, & Serketich, 1995). 
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 Use of parental psychological control in childhood may more specifically result in high 
trait fear of guilt and vulnerability to OCD.  Individuals with more severe OCD symptoms 
retrospectively rated family members as more critical and hostile than those with less severe 
OCD symptoms (Van Noppen & Steketee, 2009).  Research also suggests that mothers with 
clinical depression frequently use guilt induction to control their children’s behaviours.  These 
children frequently have difficulty distinguishing problems they caused from those over which 
they have no control – especially with the burden of their parent’s depression, whose symptoms 
children cannot alleviate – and feel responsible for things that they cannot actually control.  
Indeed, children of depressed mothers who use guilt induction as a control strategy feel more 
culpable for minor transgressions and develop more internalising problems (Rakow et al., 2009).  
As previously described, this inflated sense of responsibility is a core feature of OCD and of fear 
of guilt.   
Furthermore, children of parents who frequently use guilt induction as a psychological 
control strategy may grow to fear feeling guilty, because it appears unpredictably (i.e., parental 
pressure to feel guilt may arise in situations for which children are culpable and in situations for 
which children bear no responsibility) and may signal impending punishment or withdrawal of 
love.  As well, since these children grow up in an invalidating environment – that is, their 
internal experiences are not responded to in an appropriate and consistent way – they may grow 
to mistrust their internal states (e.g., feelings of guilt, thoughts about having done tasks 
correctly).  Thus, they may look to the external environment to inform them about valid 
responses to events, consistent with literature reported above.   
 Arguably, psychological control may affect children as early as 5-years-old, as soon as 
they are able to experience guilt, shame, or other internal pressures, and respond behaviourally 
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based on these emotions.  Findings from one study suggested that higher observer ratings of 
psychological control in parent-child interactions parent reports of internalizing problems in 
nine-year-old children.  Negative consequences of psychological control are assumed to be most 
pronounced in adolescence, consistently across early, middle and late adolescence, because it is 
developmentally normative for youth to be seeking greater independence, autonomy, and self-
control at this age (Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2010).  This may have implications for 
understanding specific times of vulnerability for the development of OCD.  
 In sum, this research has implications for our understanding of contributing factors in the 
development and persistence of OCD.  Our findings support existing models of OCD that 
highlight the importance of one’s internal sense of knowing when to stop, and propose an 
underlying mechanism, involving doubt in one’s decisions, by which researchers can understand 
perseveration.  Furthermore, better understanding of the fear of guilt construct will be important 
in informing current treatment strategies.  Individuals who do not respond to treatment, drop out 
early from therapy, or refuse treatment may perhaps have had the significance of their fear of 
guilt overlooked, thus preventing them from challenging the core concern of their OCD – 
namely, their fear of being held guilty for harm – or may not have been able to benefit from 
exposures to their feared feelings of guilt.  Additional research will need to be conducted to more 
clearly elucidate the link between and effects of fear of guilt and cautious or uncertain decision-
making in individuals with OCD. 
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Appendix A 
Fear of Guilt Scale (FOGS) 
Construct 1: Overvalued meaning of guilt 
24 I pay a lot more attention to feelings of guilt than I do to my other emotions  
23 If I feel guilty, it means I have done something bad 
39 When I do something for which I feel guilty, it means I am a callous, selfish, careless, 
and/or dishonest kind of person 
18 When I have done something for which I feel guilty it means I have not been true to the 
person I would most like to be 
20 When I have done something for which I feel guilty I will rightfully be viewed as a callous, 
selfish, careless, and/or dishonest kind of person 
33 If I feel guilty it means that I have failed as a person 
41 If I have done something for which I feel guilty, I worry that those I cherish will be 
punished 
5 I feel that all of my decisions actions are being closely watched and judged 
16 I often find myself justifying my actions to myself, hoping to prove I am blame-free 
47 I often fear that I am about to be in big trouble for having done something wrong 
35 If I don’t please “the powers that be”, it means I am bad  
42 I was raised to believe that guilt has value and/or meaning 
17 It is arrogant and/or immoral to ignore feelings of guilt 
31 Guilt is the most important emotion you can feel 
48 Feeling guilty means I care 
 
Construct 2: Reactive response to guilt  
 
12 It is not right to relax and/or enjoy myself if I have not completely atoned for something for 
which I feel guilty  
7 When I have done something for which I feel guilty, I feel very angry at myself for not 
having known better 
15 When my actions or inactions might have (but didn’t) harm or offend a living creature, I feel 
just as guilty as if I had actually caused harm/offence 
30 I do not have the right to relax or enjoy myself if I have done something for which I feel 
guilty 
9 When I feel guilty, I deprive myself of things I enjoy 
28 When I have done something for which I feel guilty, it is only right that I punish myself 
40 If I am feeling guilty, I force myself to review what I did wrong in painstaking detail both to 
identify my error and to punish myself 
25 When I have done something for which I feel guilty, I loathe myself 
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3 When I start to feel guilty, I must stop everything to figure out what I did wrong 
43 When I start to feel guilty I must start atoning right away 
32 I do not stop atoning for something I have done until I no longer feel guilty  
21 If I have done something for which I feel guilty I must fix it, atone for it and/or confess it 
before others confront me with it 
37 If I feel guilty, I must keep what I did a secret so that others don’t find out what a horrible 
person I am 
48 If I feel guilty, I must seek reassurance from others that I am not as horrible as I think I am 
34 If I cause even the slightest harm or offence to any living creature I cannot forgive myself, 
even if others can 
11 When I feel guilty, I am even more careful not to cause harm or offence than I was before 
44 My guilt quickly turns to panic and dread 
27 When I feel guilty, I find it hard to focus on anything else 
22 If I think someone is upset with me, I cannot rest until I have appeased her/him 
2 I feel guilty most of the time 
 
Construct 3: Proactive response to guilt 
 
46 I would rather die myself than cause harm of any kind to a living creature 
13 I don’t like to take an action if there is a possibility of a negative outcome, no matter how 
small 
8 I wish I could predict the future so I could avoid doing anything about which I would end up 
feeling guilty 
29 I do not allow myself to relax and/or enjoy myself unless I am certain that I have nothing to 
feel guilty about 
1 I frequently scan my memories to see if I have done anything for which I should feel guilty  
4 I do everything in my power to prevent harm or offence to any living creature 
6 I must never cause a living creature or person harm or offence, no matter how accidental, 
unavoidable or minimal – unless it is in the service of preventing greater harm 
38 I will take actions that people do not like if it means protecting them from worse harm 
26 I should have no negative impact whatsoever on the lives of any living creature 
45 If I cause even the slightest harm or offence to any living creature, they are right to reject 
me 
14 I, of all people, should not be the cause of any harm of any kind to any living creature 
36 I would do anything to avoid being guilty for something 
19 Even the thought of feeling guilty in the future is enough to change my actions so that I do 
my best to prevent it 
10 Anything I can do to avoid feeling guilty is worth doing 
  
